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I. INTRODUCTION

American purchasers of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) - securities used by
many non-U.S. companies to raise capital in the United States and by American investors to hold
equity in a foreign company -- may no longer be able to assert a claim under the anti-fraud
provisions of the Exchange Act where the fraud impacts U.S. investors or takes place in U.S.
The Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank recently held that § 1O(b) and Rule
1Ob-5 apply only when a purchase or sale of securities is "made in the United States or involved
a security listed on a domestic exchange." 1 The Court's decision was a landmark ruling in
transnational securities fraud litigation reversing decades of jurisprudence on the extraterritorial
reach of § 1O(b) of the Exchange Act.

Before Morrison lower courts applied two tests to

determine whether they possessed subject matter jurisdiction over a § 1O(b) claim with respect to
transnational securities fraud cases. 2 First, a court looked to whether the wrongful conduct
occurred in the United States -- the "conduct test."3 Second, a court looked to whether the
wrongful conduct, even if it occurred in a foreign country, had a substantial effect on U.S.
investors or markets -- the "effects test" -- in determining whether §1O(b) applied. 4 When the
courts found there were sufficient "conduct" or "effects" or a combination of both "conduct" and
"effects" on U.S. investors or markets, §1O(b) was given extraterritorial application. 5

In

Morrison the Court reversed these tests and sought to impose a different, bright-line standard.

The Morrison Court announced a new ''transactional test" to determine the geographical reach of
the Exchange Act: §1O(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 are satisfied only "with the purchase or sale of a

1

Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd, 130 S. Ct. 2869,2886 (U.S. 2010).
See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future ofExtraterritorial Application ofthe
U.S. Securities, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 542 (2011).
3
Id at 543.
4
/d at 542-43.
5
ld at 542.
2

2

security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in
the United States."6 In so holding, the Court ruled that these key antifraud provisions do not
have extraterritorial application. 7 While Morrison tries to clarify decades of muddied
jurisprudence on the proper extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-fraud securities laws, by
rejecting the "conduct" and "effects" test that federal courts have applied in adjudicating claims
brought by foreign investors against a foreign company based on shares bought on a foreign
exchange, the "f-cubed" or "foreign cubed case," 8 the Court's decision closes many doors on
U.S. investors. As a result of lower courts' recent application of the Morrison "transactional
test," the Exchange Act does not even apply to dual-listed securities and more so American
Depository Receipts (ADRs)- the so-called "f-squared" cases. 9
Morrison started out as a mix of "f-cubed" and "f-squared" claims. 10 However, by the

time the case was before the Supreme Court, the U.S. ADR holder claim was dismissed and the
case had become a purely an "f-cubed" case. 11 Though Morrison's transactional test indicates a
bright-line rule for "f-cubed" plaintiffs, the decision appears to limit, if not preclude, claims
under the Exchange Act for U.S. investors.

The transactional test in Morrison Court leads to

unfair results. Potential plaintiffs with extraterritorial § 1O(b) claims may fall into a mixture of a
6

Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
See Lauren Macias, Case Note, The "Transactional Test" Replaces the Conduct and Effects Tests" When
Determining the Extraterritorial Reach ofPrivate Rights ofAction Pursuant to Section IO(B) ofthe Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: Robert Morrison, et al. v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 13 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 75, 81 (2011).
8
Joshua L. Boehm, Presuming Too Much? The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws After Morrison and
Dodd Frank (20 11 ), http://www .law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/llm/select-papers-from-the-seminar-ininternational-fmance/index.html.
9
Id at 25. Boehm discussed that there are three potential types ofF-Squared claims: "(1) foreign investors suing
foreign issuers for fraud arising from a U.S. transaction; (2) U.S. investors suing foreign issuers for fraud arising
from a foreign transaction; and (3) foreign investors suing U.S. issuers for fraud arising from a foreign transactions."
10
Morrison v. Nat'l AustL Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2008). The complaint alleged violation of the
antifraud provision of U.S. securities laws was filed by three plaintiffs who were Australian citizens and who had
purchased National Australia Bank ("NAB") shares abroad, (foreign plaintiffs) and sought to represent a class of
non-America purchasers of NAB ordinary shares, and a fourth plaintiff, Robert Morrison, a U.S. citizen who had
purchased NAB's ADRs, and sought to represent a class of American purchasers.
11
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 (noting that Robert Morrison, the American investor in NAB's ADRs, claims were
dismissed by the District Court because he failed to allege damages).
7

3

class: some plaintiffs are ADRs holders, others purchased their shares on a foreign exchange that
are dual-listed on a U.S. exchange, and others who are pure foreign investors. However, because
of the decision in Morrison, the geographic location where these investors purchased their
securities will affect whether they can bring a§ 1O(b) claim, with some investors being able to
retain a §1O(b) and other investors will not, even though they invested in the same securities
from the same issuer. 12 Morrison's ruling leaves very little, or no exception for distinguishing
the characteristics and logic for non-U.S. based transactions. 13 Therefore, whether Morrison's
"transaction test" can be applied to transactions on a foreign exchange where the same securities
involved are dual-listed and cross-listed/ADRs on a U.S. exchange remains unresolved. This
leaves open the broad question whether U.S. investors will be able to assert any Exchange Act
claims against non-U.S. companies.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ("DoddFrank Act") that Congress enacted soon after Morrison contains provisions that purport to
overturn Morrison 's bar on §1O(b)' s extraterritorial application. While the Dodd-Frank Act
attempts to preserve the substantive reach of U.S. securities law extraterritorially, thus clarifying
the ancillary issue that §10(b) applies to U.S. security holders who purchased dual-listed
securities and ADRs that was not addressed in Morrison, the Act may not have that effect. This
is due to the fact the Dodd-Frank Act merely repeats what Morrison evinced: federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction in transnational fraud cases. Thus, Morrison and the Dodd-Frank Act
have turned transactional securities law on its head. Given the globalization of fmancial markets
and the increase in securities lawsuits, one would think that the law governing the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. securities law would be clearly established by now. This is not the case. Neither
12

Teleconference: Morrison v. National Australia Bank- Implications for Investors,
http://www.cii.org/events/aug4TeleconferenceMorrisonVNational (follow and click on MP3 recording of the call).
13 /d.

4

Congress nor the Supreme Court has addressed the extent of Rule §1Ob 's jurisdictional reach to
dual-listed securities and ADR transactions. This paper analyzes Morrison's bright-line test and
its implication for dual-listed securities and ADRs for U.S. investors. 14 The paper argues the
need for a clear and compelling pronouncement for determining the reach of § 1O(b) to apply to
dual-listed and ADRs transactions, so that companies that commit fraud affecting U.S. investors
may not be able to structure their transactions in such a way as to avoid § 1O(b)' s application.
Part I of this paper provides a background of the extraterritorial application of U.S.
securities laws prior to Morrison and how Morrison changed jurisprudence in this area. Part II
looks at the Congressional response after Morrison by passing the Dodd-Frank Act and
amending the securities acts to include provisions aimed at restoring the "conduct and effects"
test to allow the extraterritorial application of §1O(b), and also assesses the argument that
Congress enacted a poorly drafted statute that did nothing more than articulate what Morrison
concludes, i.e., federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over transnational securities fraud
cases. Part III focuses on how Morrison impacts dual-listed securities and ADRs.

Part IV

concludes that Congress is now well-positioned to make a clear pronouncement that the antifraud
provisions of U.S. securities laws reach dual-listed securities and ADRs, without which would
affect U.S. investors, U.S. securities markets and Congressional regulatory goals in the area of
transnational securities transactions. The paper urges Congress to adopt legislation that
accomplishes this worthwhile objective.

Beyea~ supra note 2, at 574 (discussing that "Cross-listed companies' shares trade primarily on a local exchange,
but are also traded in a secondary listing on an exchange in another country~ generally in the form of depositary
receipts. (If the secondazy listing is in the U.S., for example, these will be American Depositary Receipts.) Duallisted companies have their shares directly listed on multiple stock exchanges").
14

5

II.

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL LANDSCAPE OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW BEFORE MORRISON

v.

NATIONALAUSTRALIA BANK AND AFTER

A. The Framework ofU.S. Securities Law and §10(b) Jurisprudence Before Morrison
The Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "33 Act"), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the "34 Act") are the two fundamental statutes in U.S. securities law enacted
to protect the public and investors from fraudulent activities on the securities markets. 15 The '33
Act regulates the public offering of securities. Generally, unless an exemption applies, an issuer
is required to file a registration statement and prospectus with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") prior to offering or selling any securities. 16

The "33 Act generally

contains three key antifraud provisions: Sections 11, 12(a) and 17. 17 Section 11 provides a
private cause of action to investors when a registration statement contains "an untrue statement
of a material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading." 18 Section 12(a)(2) also provides a private cause of
action when any person who offers or sells a security, by "means of a prospectus or oral
communication" that includes a material misstatement or omission, is liable to her purchaser for
rescission or damages. 19 Section 17 prohibits "fraudulent interstate transactions." 20
Similarly, the '34 Act contains antifraud provisions that prohibit fraudulent conduct in the
market? 1 The most important antifraud provisions of the '34 Act are §10(b) and Rule 10b-5
promulgated under section 1O(b) that prohibits "manipulation or deception ... in connection with

15

See Julie B. Rubenstein, Fraud on the Global Market: U.S. Courts Don't Buy It; Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in
F-Cubed Securities Class Actions, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 727, 632 (2010).
16
!d.; See JAMES D. COX ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 115 (6th ed. 2009).
17

The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 77k; Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 632-33.
19
15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2).
20
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
21
Rubenstein, supra note 15, at 63 3.
18
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the purchase or sale of any security."22 "The "overwhelming majority" of class actions based on
securities fraud claims, including transnational cases, are filed under Rule lOb-5. 23
The '33 Act applies to all issuers who are subject to its registration requirements. 24
Likewise, Rule 1Ob-5 applies broadly to "any person directly or indirectly by the use any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce" defrauds an investor. 25

However, both the '33 Act

and the '34 Act are silent on the extent to which U.S. securities laws apply outside of the United
States. 26 Notwithstanding that these laws do not specifically cover extraterritorial acts, prior to
Morrison, the guiding principle that U.S. courts applied as to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities laws was whether Congress intended §lO(b) to protect United States or foreign
investors against fraudulent securities transactions that occurred abroad. 27 Over pass several
decades U.S. courts have, albeit with some difficulty, applied two different tests, the "conduct"
test and the "effect" test to find that they have jurisdiction to hear f-cubed cases, giving the "34
Act extraterritorial force. 28 Mainly developed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
the case law prior to Morrison "presupposed that a foreign issuer's conduct within the United
States or the effect of the conduct within the United States or a mixture of both,"29 gave rise to
U.S. securities liability even though the transactions occurred outside the United States. Though
the "conduct and/or effects" test became the avenue the U.S. courts used to extend jurisdiction to

22

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
See Amanda Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and
Private Enforcement ofRule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2008).
24
Boehm supra note 8, at 5. (emphasis added).
25
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). (emphasis added)
26
Boehm supra note 8, at 7.
27
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that when Congress passed the
Securities Laws regulation it could not have foresee the development of overseas transaction forty years later. Thus,
its decision rest on what Congress would have wished for, that is, the extraterritorial application of the antifraud
provisions of U.S. Securities laws).
28
See Franca A. Franz, Offshore Funds and Rule 1Ob-5: An International Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
under the Exchange Act of 1934, 8 FORDHAMINT'L L.J. 396,428 (1984).
29
Wolf-George Ringe et al, The International Dimension ofIssuers Liability -Liability and Choice ofLaw from a
Transatlantic Perspective, 31 O.J.L.S. 35, 39 (2011).
23
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hear transnational securities fraud claims, because it was left to the federal courts to shape the
extraterritorial bounds of the securities laws, many commentators criticized the conduct and

° Consequently, critics noted that the "conduct"

effect test for not creating a bright-line rule. 3

and/or "effect" tests were arbitrarily applied, with §1O(b) jurisprudence being interpreted and
applied differently across the circuit courts at the time the Supreme Court decided to hear the
Morrison case. 31

B. Morrison v. National Australia Bank

In ruling that §10(b) and Rulel0-5 do not apply extraterritorially, the Supreme Court in
Morrison announced a new "transactional test" which instructs lower courts not to look for some

wrongful conduct or effect to bring non-US issuers under the ambit of the antifraud provisions of
U.S. securities laws. 32 Rather, the transactional test requires courts to look to "only transactions
in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities."33
In Morrison, a group of Australian investors holding National Australia Banks' ("NAB")
ordinary shares and an American investor holding NAB's ADRs filed a putative class action
against the bank alleging that it knowingly issued misleading financial statements and press
releases to its shareholders in violation of §1O(b ), Ru1e 1Ob-5 and §20(a) of '34 Act. 34 The
plaintiffs alleged that NAB "misled investors concerning its American subsidiary's financial
30

See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuit,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 505; See Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory ofthe
Extraterritorial Application ofthe Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I071, 1092 (20IO); See Hannah L.
Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14,24 (2007).
31
!d.; See Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: §JO(b) After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, II CHI. J. INT'L L.
343, 358 (20II)(noting that the Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits adopted a similar interpretation of the "conduct
test," "requiring that the domestic conduct be predominant and sufficiently central to the claim of fraud, ... while the
Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have followed a much less restrictive approach, "requiring only that at least some
activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occur in the United States").
32
Kara Baquizal, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach ofSection JO(B): Revisiting Morrison in Light ofDodd-Frank,
34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. I544, 1568 (20II).
33
!d. at 1583 (citing Morrison, 130 S. Ct. n.138).
34
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 (Robert Morrison, the American who was initially involved cases was dismissed for
failure to show damages at the district court level).

8

performance and operation based on false calculations of its subsidiary's mortgage servicing fees
to meet overinflated earnings targets."35
The Supreme Court dismissed the case under its "transactional test" because the conduct
plaintiffs' alleged occurred outside the United States. 36 The majority opinion reasoned that the
inference that the securities laws indicate an extraterritorial application was not a compelling
reason for lower courts to surmise that Congress intended the act to apply extraterritorially. 37 On
this basis the Court rejected the "conduct and effects" test stating that there's no explicit
language in the Exchange Act as to the extraterritorial application of §10(b). 38 Morrison's
holding changed over forty years of§lO(b) jurisprudence. U.S. securities laws no longer reach
fraudulent transactions that occur outside of the United States.
C. The Dodd-Frank Act: Why Congress Needs to Make Clear its Intent
When Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in the immediate aftermath of Morrison, the Act
adds an extraterritoriality provision to §lO(b), which attempts to foreclose the Court's limitation
to §lO(b) and Rule lOb-S applicability outside the United States. The Act aimed to empower the
SEC and the Department of Justice to bring suits based on foreign conduct that satisfied either
the effects or conduct tests and to study whether the "conduct" and "effect" test for
extraterritorial application should be extended to private litigants. 39 However, many scholars

35

Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 547, F.3d 167
Cir. (2d Cir. 2008) (NO. 07-0583-cv).
36
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
37
Boehm supra note 8, at 20 (discussing that the Court considered and rejected the principal argument by SEC that
Congress intended some extraterritorial application of§ 1O(b) because of references to foreign commercial activity in
several sections ofthe 1934 Act).
38 Id
39
Dodd Frank Act §929(P)(b)(2) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.-The district courts of the
United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of the
antifraud provisions of this title involving( I) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors;
or

9

noted that a closer look at the Dodd-Frank Act shows that it does not undo Morrison but merely
repeats what the Morrison Court said: that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction for
cases brought against foreign issuers under §10(b). 40

As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act

exacerbates the confusions as to the extraterritorial application of §10(b) and Rule10b-5.
The Dodd-Frank Act was amended soon after the Supreme Court reiterated the
presumption against extraterritoriality of the application of Rule 1O(b), that the legislative history
of the '34 Act and §30 of the Exchange Act support that U.S. securities laws reach outside the
United States.41 One would think that the Dodd-Frank Act resolved any uncertainties following

Morrison that §1O(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 will apply to foreign transactions, especially where the
foreign shares are dual-listed on a U.S. exchange or ADR programs. However, a reading of the
provisions shows that the Dodd-Frank Act does not. The language of the Dodd-Frank does not
make clear the extraterritorial changes in the application of the securities law. 42 Many
commentators observed that the Dodd-Frank Act speaks to subject matter jurisdiction that lower
courts have employed for claims arising under the anti-fraud provision of the '34 Act, which the
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States.39
Under §929Y The study:
shall consider and analyze, among other things( I) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it should extend to
all private actors or whether it should be more limited to extend just to institutional
investors or otherwise;
(2) what implications such a private right of action would have on international
comity;
(3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of action for transnational
securities frauds; and
(4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be adopted.
40
See Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or
Sufficient, 1 HARv. Bus L.J. 195,205 (2011); See Richard W. Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When
Courts and Congress Don't Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to
the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions ofthe Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MfNN. J. INT'L L. 1, 19 (2011); See George T.
Conway III, Extraterritoriality ofthe Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank: Partly Because of a Drafting
Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged (2010).
http://www. wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew!WLRKMemos/WLRKIWLRK.17763 .I 0 .pdf.
41
See Meny Elgadeh, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Life After Dodd-Frank, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
573, 585-87 (2011).
42
Beyea supra note 2, at 571; Painter supra note 40, at 200.

10

Supreme Court pronounced in Morrison.

43

The language of the Act is silent on the geographic

scope of the substantive reach of §10(b) and Rule 10b-5.44 As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act
further muddied the waters even more as to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities laws
leaving unanswered the questions: whether Dodd-Frank Act overturns the holding in Morrison
by applying Section 10(b) to some securities transactions outside the United States; and whether
Dodd-Frank reinstates the conduct and effects test that the Second Circuit and many other
circuits had used prior to Morrison and, if so, what conduct does § 1O(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 reach
and prohibit.45
The hazy legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act of any change in the extraterritorial
application of U.S. securities law makes the Dodd-Frank Section 929P extraterritorial provisions
irrelevant, unless Congress makes clear the applicable scope of the '34 Act. It is unclear whether
Congress intended to address the merits of § 1O(b) extraterritorial application or whether
Congress intended only to address jurisdiction, the power of the courts to hear a case. 46
However, many commentators reason that Congress simply made a mistake and drafted the
provisions incorrectly, by relying on the language that the various courts of appeals have used
over the years to address the extraterritorial reach of Section 1O(b) as a question of subject matter
jurisdiction rather than as a merit question - namely whether § 1O(b) applies outside the United
States.47 When the Supreme Court in Morrison articulated the extraterritorial reach of Section
1O(b) a question of the merits rather than jurisdiction, the drafters of the Act failed to change the

43

See supra note 40.
See George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality After Dodd Frank, -The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/20 10/08/05/extraterritoriality-afterdodd-frank/.
45
Painter supra note 40, at 200.
46
Painter supra note 40, at 206.
47
Painter supra note 40, at 202; Beyea supra note 2, at 571; See Andrew Rocks, Note, Whoops! The Imminent
Reconciliation of U.S. Securities Laws with International Comity after Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the
Drafting Error in the Dodd-Frank Act, 56 VILL. L. REv. 163, 192 (2011).
44

11

statutory language.

48

Irrespective of the reason for Congress' drafting error, lower courts still

must determine whether there is Congressional intent to provide substantive extraterritoriality to
§ 1O(b ). The district courts applied Morrison and ruled that § 1O(b) applies only to domestic
transactions, dismissing claims of U.S. plaintiffs who have either purchased ADRs or securities
on a foreign exchange that are dual-listed on an American exchange. 49 Given the district courts'
helter skelter treatment of Morrison in extraterritorial cases and the SEC's forthcoming study of
the extraterritorial application of § 1O(b ), Congress should enact legislation that "domestic
transactions in other securities" 50 means that § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 extends to dual-listed
securities and ADRs.
Ill. How MORRISON'S NARROW TEST MAY PRECLUDE VIABLE §lO(B) CLAIMS OF U.S.
INVESTORS AND DIMINISH THE TRANSNATIONAL MARKET REGULATORY GOALS OF U.S.
SECURITIES LAW

As Morrison is known as an "f-cubed" case, what the decision will signify for dual-listed
securities and ADRs transaction remains a tangled web of case law.

For example, since

Morrison U.S. plaintiffs in cases pending before the lower federal courts have argued that
because the facts of Morrison lend themselves to an "f-cubed" case, the Court's language that
§ 1O(b) applies to "securities listed on a domestic exchange," does not preclude § 1O(b)' s
application where a foreign company issues misleading statements overseas and the stocks about
which the misleading statements were made are also dual or cross-listed/ADRs transactions.

51

However, the lower courts have rejected plaintiffs' argument and have interpreted Morrison's
48

Painter supra note 40) at 200 (discussing that Congress's drafting error is supported by legislative records because
an earlier version of the "provisions provided extraterritorial jurisdiction with respect to antifraud provisions in the
federal securities laws if there is "conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of
the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors'').
49
Macias supra note 7, at 88; Beyea supra note 2) at 573; See Daniel Hemel, Comment, Issuer Choice After
Morrison, 28 YALEJ. ON REG. 471,473-75 (2011).
50
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
51
See Irwin H. Warren et al, Transnational Securities Litigation In The US. Courts After Morrison v. National
Australia Bank: An "F-Cubed" Regression Analysis, http://www. weil.com/news/pubdetial.aspx?pub= 10061.
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transactional test to focus on the place where the securities transaction occurred. 52 According to
the lower courts, § 1O(b) will not apply if the transactions took place abroad even if the security at
issue is listed on a U.S. exchange. 53 Given that ADRs "are hybrids of foreign and domestic
securities,"

54

the issue of whether Morrison's transactional test applies to ADRs is unclear. As a

result of the unsettled law as to ADRs lower courts' interpretation of Morrison should give U.S.
investors concern that the protection of § 1O(b) may no longer be available to their ADR
transactions.
In the months following Morrison lower federal courts, particularly the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) in interpreting the meaning of the first
prong of Morrison's transaction test "securities listed on a domestic exchange," held that in order
for § 1O(b) to apply the actual transaction must occur on a domestic exchange. 55 In Re Alstom SA

Securities Litigation is a case where U.S. investors-plaintiffs purchased securities on a French
stock exchange but the foreign issuer's common shares were registered and listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. The plaintiffs argued that because the foreign issuer's shares were also
listed on a domestic exchange, § 1O(b) should apply. The court concluded, however, that it is not
enough for a security to be merely listed on a domestic exchange. Rather, the transaction must
also occur on that domestic exchange. 56 Likewise, in In re Royal Bank ofScot. Group P LC Sec.

Litigation, the court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the defendants' ADRs, traded on the

52

Hemel supra note 50, at 474.
/d.
Vincent M. Chiappini, How American are American Depository Receipts? ADRs, Rule JOB-5 Suits, and Morrison
v. National Australia Bank, 52 B.C. L. REv. 1795, 1816 (2011) (discussing that ADRs are hybrids ofU.S. and
foreign securities because "they are sold in the United States and represent shares in a foreign corporation").
55
Hemel supra note 50, at 474; In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
56
In Re Alstom at 473.
53
54
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NYSE, were "listed" securities under Morrison and therefore triggered §1O(b) application. 57 In
another case, In re Societe Generate Securities Litigation where plaintiffs included those who
purchased SocGen ADRs in the U.S. over-the-counter market, the court opined that "trade in
ADRs is considered to be a predominantly foreign securities transaction." 58 In a more recent
case, In re Vivendi Universal, SA. Sec. Litigation, the court concluded that § 1O(b) does not apply
to overseas transactions in securities that are cross-listed on domestic and foreign exchanges. 59
In interpreting the second prong of Morrison 's transaction test "domestic transaction in other
securities," the court held that under Morrison, §1O(b) does not apply to any securities purchased
on a foreign exchange even if some aspects of the transaction occurred in the United States. 60
The lower courts' interpretation of Morrison severely limits the protection of U.S. anti-fraud
securities laws to protect the U.S. public and investors who invest in foreign companies. 61
The negative consequences of Morrison for ADR holders are significant. To understand
Morrison's implication it is necessary to understand that dual-listed securities and ADR

transactions have become essential instruments for U.S. investors to own equity interest in
foreign companies, and for foreign companies to raise capital in the United States, 62 and how
these securities operate and are treated within the substantive law of U.S. securities regulation.
The term dual-listed and cross-listed or ADRs securities are used interchangeably. The
57

Boehm supra note 8, at 38; In re Royal Bank of Scot. Group PLC Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327,336 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (holding that plaintiffs argument failed under Morrison because §1O(b) does not apply to securities "merely
because it has "listed" some securities in the United States").
58
Boehm supra note 8, at 28; In re Societe Generale Sec. Litig., No. 08. Civ. 2495, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107719,
at*14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010).
59
Hemel supra note 50, at 473; In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
60
Robert P. Bartlett, III et al, Commentary, Comments by Forty-Two Professors on 4-6I 7: Study on Extraterritorial
Private Rights ofAction, http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617 -28.pdf; Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729
F. Supp. 2d 620,622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
61
See Linda J. Silberman, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global Securities Class Actions
(2011) available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi:n?abstract id=1864786 (observing the Morrison's
exchange-based interpretation not only limits the reach of U.S. securities laws in f-cubed cases by also in cases in
which U.S. investors purchase on a foreign exchange).
62
Teleconference: Morrison v. National Australia Bank- Implications for Investors supra note 12.

14

difference between the two is that dual listed companies "have their shares directly listed on
multiple stock exchanges," whereas cross-listed or ADRs are securities that are traded locally on
a foreign issuer home country exchange "but are also traded on a secondary listing in another
country."63 Where the local country is the United States the cross-listed securities are ADRs. 64
ADRs were first introduced in the United States in 1927 and are the most popular method used
by foreign companies to raise capital in the United States. 65 Similarly, foreign firms can also
raise capital in the United States by directly listing their ordinary shares on a U.S. exchange. 66
Likewise, "U.S. investors interested in investing in a foreign firm can do so by purchasing the
ADRs in the U.S. or by purchasing the underlying stocks in the home market of the firm, or by
doing both." 67 An ADR is dollar-denominated certificate that represents proof of ownership of
foreign securities of a publicly traded non-U.S. company. 68 A U.S. depository bank holds the
foreign firm's stock and issues depository certificates to an investor who has ownership of the
ADRs. 69 The investor can convert his ADRs for the underlying shares of the foreign company. 70
Each ADR represents a set number of the underlying shares. 71 Once the foreign shares are
deposited, the ADRs "are quoted and traded in U.S. dollars on a U.S. exchange," like listed U.S.
securities. 72 The dividends are also paid in U.S. dollars to the ADR holders. 73 There are two

63

Beyea supra note 2, at 574 n.159.
ld n.159.
65
See Mark Saunders, American Depository Receipts: An Introduction to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign
Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 48, 50 (1993).
66
See Amir N. Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 141,
(2003) (noting that the dominant factor for the choice of cross-listing is to "access cheaper fmance and enhance the
issuer's visibility").
67
Renna Aggarwal et al, ADR Holdings of U.S. Bases Emerging Market Funds (2005)
http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/Cmrc/papers/CMRC-05-04.pdf.
68
ld at 7.
69
Id at 7.
70
Id (discussing there is an additional cost that the investor will incur is cost such as conversion fee and foreign
exchange transactional cost).
71
Id at 7-8.
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types of ADRs: (1) sponsored ADRs, whereby the foreign issuer participates in the ADR
program by depositing it shares in a depository bank; 74 and (2) unsponsored ADR programs
whereby a depository establishes an ADR facility without the participation of the foreign
issuer. 75 ADRs are traded on U.S. exchanges. 76
ADRs are established under one of four different levels. 77 Level 1 and IV "involve overthe-counter ('OTC) pink sheet listing, are issued under Rule 144/Reg Sand require 'minimal or
no SEC registration." 78 Levels II and III are publicly traded on U.S. exchanges and the foreign
issuer is subject to U.S. securities law disclosure requirements. 79

Level II ADRs require

registration under the 1934 Act. 80 Level III ADRs are subject to disclosure requirements under
both the 1933 and 1934 Act. 81 The 1934 Act requires that securities that are traded on an
exchange in the United States must be registered. As such, under the 1934 Act the depositary
shares represented by the ADRs are securities and unless the ADRs are exempt they must be
registered before they are publicly distributed within the United States.82 Foreign issuers that list
on a U.S. exchange must comply with the registration and reporting standards of the 1934 Act. 83

74

Saunders supra note 66, at 55-56 (discussing that issuers of ADRs enter into an agreement with the depository, a
U.S. commercial bank by signing Form F-6 registration statement, which in turn issues depository certificates for the
sales of the underlying shares in the United States. "The agreement governs the responsibility of the parties and set
forth the fees").
75
/d. at 55 (discussing that the depositary must file a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933 and "the
depositary can accept deposits of securities of a foreign private issuer and issue ADRs with respect to such
deposits." The ADR certificate acts as a contract between the ADR holder and the depositary).
76
Id at 57 (discussing that "ADRs are traded in the United States on the New York Stock Exchange, the American
Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System ("NASDAQ"), and the
National Association of Security Dealers ("NASD") over-the- counter pink sheets").
77
See J. Michael Pinegar, When does Bonding Bond? The Case ofADRs and GDRs (2003) available at SSRN:
http://ssm.com/abstract=499804.
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In addition foreign companies must reconcile their financial statements in accordance with the
US General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 84
ADRs have become one of the most common financial instruments purchased by U.S.
investors to diversify their investment portfolio and access foreign equities through domestically
traded securities. 85 In the first halfof2011, "$1.91 trillion of DRs traded on U.S. and non-U.S.
markets and exchanges, a record high and a 4.5% increase year-over-year. " 86 ADR programs and
cross-listings have generated significant positive returns for shareholders in the United States. 87
Specifically, U.S. institutional investors holding ADRs through Rule 144 offerings have become
an essential part of acquiring a diversified portfolio. 88 If the lower courts interpretation of
Morrison holds, U.S. investors would have limited legal protection under U.S. securities laws for

ADR transactions. Consider too that Morrison will shrink if not extinguish U.S. investors'
ability to recover money lost on a foreign exchange, and these investors will be less willing to
invest in ADRs if they cannot deploy U.S. antifraud protection laws to sue for securities
misconduct overseas.
As noted above the SDNY has applied Morrison's transaction test "in strict fashion,"
holding that §10(b) applies to transactions that occur on a U.S. exchange by looking solely to the
location of the transactions and nothing more. 89 The lower courts have not distinguished or
examined the different types of ADR programs and their varied characteristics to determine that
84

Pinegar supra note 78, at 2. The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has been developing new
disclosure standards for incorporating into GAAP to remove the differences between international standards and
U.S. GAAP accounting standards. The purpose of this is to converge both domestic and cross-border fmancial
reporting standards for U.S. and non-U.S. companies, http://www.ifrs.org/Home.htm.
85
Beyea, supra note 2, at 568.
86
See, "The Depository Receipts Market 2011 Mid-Year Market Review,"
http://www .adrbnymellon.com/dr_pub_statistics.jsp (last visited Dec. 14, 20 II).
87
Hemel supra note 50, at 477.
88
Teleconference: Morrison v. National Australia Bank- Implications for Investors supra note 12; See Roger W.
Kirby, Access to United States Courts by Purchases ofForeign Listed Securities in the Aftermath ofMorrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd, 7 HASTING Bus. L.J. 223,251 (2011).
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Boehm supra note 8, at 25.
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different categories of ADR transactions "merit different levels of liability under §I O(b)." 90 The
SDNY has dismissed many cases that would not have been rejected prior to Morrison. 91 These
post-Morrison cases have created further "confusion and ambiguity" 92 in the application of U.S.

securities law for fraudulent conduct outside the United States involving dual-listed securities
and ADRs on a U.S. exchange. Consequently, the lower courts interpretation of Morrison has
limited, if not prohibited, the protection that U.S. securities laws afforded U.S. investors. 93
Based on Morrison's reasoning U.S. investors having similar securities from an issuer are treated
differently purely based on where the securities may have been purchased. 94 Whether a U.S.
investor may purchase ADRs on a U.S. exchange or the underlying shares on a foreign exchange,
or in cases where the investor may not know he executed a particular ADR or foreign share trade
because the investor bought the shares based on best price, could detrimentally effect his ability
to bring a claim under §1O(b) against the issuer for the same fraudulent conduct. 95 Prior to
Morrison, it was clear that U.S. investors could seek a remedy in the court against a foreign

issuer. Today, given that§lO(b) may not apply to certain ADR and foreign shares purchases,
U.S. investors not only have to ponder as to where to purchase their securities, but what are the
legal risks involve based on the location of the purchase of such investment. 96
Morrison will impact the ability of U.S. institutional investors --and individual investors-

- ability to bring class action claims for fraudulent conduct overseas. 97 The standard set out by
the lower courts to exclude ADR plaintiffs makes it easier for fon~~ign issuers to capitalize on this

9

°Chiappini supra note 55, at 1821.

91

Boehm supra note 8, at 32 (discussing that many cases have been dismissed because of Morrison's transactional
test).
92
Robert P. Bartlett, III et al supra note 61, at 13.
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trend and structure their transactions to avoid § 1O(b) application "while still benefitting from the
fraudulent conduct of their U.S. subsidiaries." 98 The effect of Morrison has the potential of
leaving a significant group of investors without adequate remedy when harmed by fraudulent
conduct outside the United States, which in tum can indirectly harm U.S. markets. 99 The
negative impact of Morrison is no small matter.

There are approximately 421 non-US

companies whose ordinary shares are listed on the U.S. exchange valued at $11.4 trillion. 100
"The total value of U.S. investment in non-U.S. equities (both DRs and non-U.S. shares)
increased 13.8% year-over-year to $4.6 trillion." 101 Not only are foreign issuers able to raise a
significant amount of capital, but listing on a U.S. exchange such as the NYSE, the largest
equities marketplace in the world, enables foreign issuers to increase their visibility with U.S.
institutional investors, "which makes it easier to raise additional capital in the future, and
increases liquidity for the company's shares." 102 The Southern District's decision in post-

Morrison cases that under Morrison's precedent § 10 (b) doesn't apply to the transaction so long
as it takes place abroad, 103 not only bar a significant number of investors from raising a § 1O(b)
claim against these foreign issuers, but could also lead to inequitable results. ADRs issuer could
structure their securities transactions to defraud U.S. investors while at the same time reap the
benefits of the markets to sell their securities. 104

98

See Genevieve Beyea, Transnational Securities Fraud and the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities
Laws: Challenges and Opportunities (2011) available at
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99
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100
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Despite the legal loophole that Morrison created about the application of U.S. securities
laws to dual-listed securities and ADR transactions, proponents of Morrison's transaction test
argued that the lower courts' interpretation of the decisions as applied to dual-listed securities "is
consistent with the basic thrust of Morrison which focuses on the location of the transactions." 105
Proponents noted that plaintiffs' attorneys' argwnent that § 1O(b) applies to securities listed on an
U.S. exchange, even though the foreign issuers' shares are traded on a foreign exchange, is
wrong. 106 Wulf A. Kaal and Richard W. Painter who co-authored an article on the Supreme
Court's decision in Morrison argued that the Supreme Court recognized that National Australia
Bank's ADRs were listed on the New York exchange and when the court referred to ''transaction
in securities listed on a domestic exchange" the court "had to mean transaction in those
exchanges, not merely the listing of securities on those exchanges." 107 Further, according to
Irwin H. Warren and Matthew E.K. Howatt, lawyers in a New York law flrm, the registering and
listing of ADRs in the United States should not be used as a "Trojan horse" to get to U.S. courts
for claims arising out of foreign purchase of common shares. 108 Citing to the holding in In re
Alstom SA Securities Litigation, as a correct reading of Morrison, Warren and Howatt argued

that foreign issuers list their common shares for technical purposes and thus such claim should
not fall within the "ambit of Morrison's transactional test." 109 In addition, though the Morrison
court did not define what constitutes "listed," the defmition of "listed" under the '34 Act and the
common meaning of "listed security" militate against the argwnent that§ lO(b) reaches non-U.S.

105

Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, The Aftermath ofMorrsion v. National Australia Bank and Elliott
Associates v. Porsche, ECFR (20 11) available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract=176590 1; Basquizal, supra note 32
at 1568.
106
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107
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purchases of the common stocks underlying ADRs that are listed on a U.S. exchange. 110
Proponents also suggest that Morrison's bright-line rule would deter non-U.S. companies from
listing in the United States because of fear that they would be subject to U.S. securities laws for
transaction that occur outside of the United States, which in turn will affect the U.S. markets.u 1
Despite these arguments, proponents of Morrison 's bright-line rule cast aside that the
Supreme Court ruling indicates that either the Court failed to grasp the nature of ADRs"
transactions or "simply made a mistake in drafting the opinion." 112 The defendant NAB's ADRs
were listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the company was subjected to U.S. securities
laws reporting requirements. 113 When a foreign issuer sponsors and lists ADRs on the New York
Stock Exchange, the ADRs and the underlying shares must be registered with the SEC. 114
"ADRs unquestionably are securities, and Morrison explicitly acknowledges that § 1O(b) reaches
"the purchase or sale of any other security in the United States." 115 The Court's decision then
that § 1O(b) applies to any security listed on a U.S. exchange and that Section 1O(b) did not apply
to NAB's ordinary shares seems inconsistent and shows that the court either "overlooked" this or
"failed to grasp that Levels 2 and 3 ADRs are in fact listed on U.S. exchanges," 116 and subject to
the 1934 Act reporting requirements.

Concomitantly, the lower court's interpretation of

Morrison that "ADRs is considered to be a predominantly foreign securities transaction," 117
means that§lO(b) may not apply to U.S. plaintiffs who purchased ADRs in the United States-especially Levels II and III ADRs- even though when an investor purchases ADRs through a

110/d
111

Id See generally Howell E. Jackson, Summary Research Findings on Extra-Territorial Application ofFederal
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depository bank he is trading in the U.S. market. 118 The ramification of the lower courts'
interpretation of Morrison is that courts treat economically equivalent shares differently 119 and
Morrison has produced uncertainty.

Further, though ADR certificates represent the ownership of the underlying security in a
non-U.S. company, ADR holders can convert their ADRs into the underlying share. 120 Similarly,
"holders of underlying shares can convert the shares into ADRs if they exist in the US
markets." 121 Though price dynamics such as foreign exchange rates differentiate the dollar price
between the ADR and the underlying shares, 122 since ADRs are traded in the US markets like
ordinary shares and are securities under §3(10) of the Exchange Act, 123 American purchasers
own the underlying foreign security. 124 ADRs, specifically Levels II and III, are subjected to
U.S. securities regulation. 125 Rule 144A offerings and Level I ADR programs, though they are
unlisted and are sold over-the-counter, both "have significant connections to the United
States." 126 Rule 144A offerings and Level I ADR programs trade in U.S. dollars, are designed
by foreign corporations to gain access to American investors, and in the case of Rule 144
offerings to raise capital in the United States. 127 Furthermore, unlike the ADR transaction, "the
securities sold in a Rule 144A offering are not really even foreign securities; they are new
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Beyea supra note 2, at 574 n.177 (discussing that it would be a radical result that Morrison would not apply to
plaintiffs who had purchased U.S.-Iisted ADRs in the United States and "the more likely explanation .. .is that lower
courts are simply misconstruing Morrison in applying it to dismiss the claims of U.S. purchasers who bought ADRs
in the United States"); Chiappini supra note 55, at 1825.
u 9 Robert P. Bartlett, III et al supra note 61, at 7.
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securities created exclusively for American investors." 128 By sponsoring these varied ADRs
programs an issuer brings itself into the U.S. securities law regime, in particular § 10(b). 129
Having to satisfy U.S. securities laws reporting requirements, ADR issuers then should
"naturally and fairly" be held liable "for deceptive acts related to the U.S. securities it caused to
be issued." 130 Thus, though lower courts treat ADRs as a foreign transaction by the mere fact that
the depository bank purchased the underlying foreign security, the U.S. investor's purchase of
the ADR issued by the depository bank should be a transaction subject to §1O(b). 131
Further, "§ 1O(b) explicitly encompasses purchases or sales of securities. " 132 Therefore,
an exchange of shares qualifies as a sale for § 1O(b) purposes. 133 When U.S. shareholders sell or
convert their ADRs, the sale or conversion of ADRs should receive § 1O(b) protection. 134 It is
incongruous that investors holding similar shares from the same issuer can sue under §1O(b) for
the shares that are purchased on a U.S. exchange, but not for the shares purchased on a foreign
exchange for precisely the same conduct particularly in light of increasing globalization of
securities markets. Thus, the lower courts' decision that ADRs are foreign transactions
underscores the need for Congress to pass legislation for the extraterritorial application of the
anti-fraud provision of U.S. securities law.
Furthermore, although Morrison provides some certainty in the law for "f-cubed" cases,
the Supreme Court's standard, if applied purely to domestic transactions, could "frustrate the
goals of the U.S. regulatory regime" 135 in addressing transnational fraud affecting the U.S.
public, U.S. investors and the integrity of the securities market. The lower courts' interpretation
128
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of Morrison opens the door for a foreign issuer to issue material misstatements overseas
involving stocks listed on a U.S. exchange, and the issuer will be immune from § 1O(b) and Rule
lOb-5 liability ''than would a comparably positioned U.S. issuer listed on the U.S. exchange." 136
As such, foreign issuers would have less incentive to comply with U.S. disclosure laws even
when they are subjected to U.S. securities law regulatory requirements.

137

The United States has

a legitimate reason for extending its antifraud provisions outside the United States.
U.S. securities regulations protect against fraudulent conduct, mainly misleading public
disclosures. The purpose of this rule is to protect investors by employing devices for corporate
disclosure. Therefore, for foreign issuers whose securities are dual-listed on a U.S. exchange or
chose to sponsor ADRs programs, U.S. securities laws provide for "two securities regulation
regimes: one for domestic issuers and one for foreign ones." 138 Foreign firms are excluded from
certain of the corporate governance provisions of securities law if they satisfy certain
requirements. However, as discussed above foreign firms sponsoring ADRs are subjected to
U.S. disclosure laws. 139 Similarly, dual-listed companies are "subjected to §lO(b) liability with
respect to material misrepresentations or omissions in connection with the securities listed on a
U.S. exchange." 140 However, regulation governing corporate governance relating to corporate
insiders is inferior to those governing American issuers, in particular "disclosure of corporate
interest." 141 "Foreign issuers are exempt from disclosing data concerning material transactions
with officers, directors, and control persons, unless the issuer already makes such disclosure," 142
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as compared to U.S. issuers who must meet more demanding disclosure in this area. The result
of Morrison is that foreign issuer insiders could trade in "cross-listed securities with information
on price differences of the same security in both their home market and the U.S. market "with
impunity as long as they relegate their transactions to foreign exchanges," 143 giving potential
violators the "opportunity to engage in cross-exchange regulatory arbitrage." 144 Yet according
to Morrison § 1O(b) may not apply to the insider trading activities simply because the fraudulent
act took place outside the United States, even though the conduct involves and affects shares
dual or cross-listed on an American exchange. Thus, Morrison's ruling leads to investors being
treated differently for the same injury. 145 A strict interpretation of Morrison poses the problem
that "§ 1O(b) may become a dead letter," if it doesn't apply to dual listed and ADRs listed on U.S.
exchange. 146 If Morrison is interpreted to restrict § 1O(b) to only domestic transactions, without
clarification from Congress, U.S. securities law would not be able to protect some classes of U.S.
investors.
Proponents of Morrison's bright-line rule argue that Morrison was correctly decided, and
neither the courts nor the Dodd Frank Act should abrogate its decision. 147 One of the primary
arguments that proponents put forth is that Morrison upholds the principle of international
comity. 148 Citing Justice Scalia's reasoning that comity justifies the limitation on § 10(b)'s
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extraterritorial application, proponents assert that Morrison respects the sovereignty of foreign
nations by allowing them to establish liability rules best suited to their own financial markets. 149
Further, extending U.S. securities antifraud laws to private causes of action for the purchase of
shares on foreign exchanges "would be an impermissible imposition of U.S. substantive and
procedural law on foreign nations" against Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, which prohibits jurisdiction over a person or activity with "connections to
another staten where it is unreasonable to do so. 150 Moreover, proponents argue because other
countries have enacted their own regulatory regime to enforce securities fraud within their
borders, though the regulation of financial markets is desirable, allowing § 1O(b) to apply to other
countries could create jurisdictional conflicts with the securities laws of other nations. 151
The foregoing comity arguments are weak. There is a strong justifiable interest of the
United States in providing U.S. investors and American markets with the antifraud provisions of
§ 1O(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 to address fraud in cross-border securities transactions. Foreign

companies will benefit as well by having their cross-border securities transaction protected by
U.S. anti-fraud law. With the increasing globalization of securities markets, securities
transactions are connected from country to country, which makes it no longer feasible to define a
domestic transaction or "where the transaction occurs with clarity." 152

The integration of

securities transactions and capital markets has increased transnational securities fraud.
149
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"flow of transactions on global markets means that domestic conditions within the United States
can sometimes be affected even if the specific claim in question does not flow from a domestic
transaction." 153 Pre-Morrison courts entertained securities fraud claims of investors who
purchased on foreign exchanges where there was significant "conduct" or "effects" in the United
States. 154 Morrison means that U.S. courts now only look to the location of the transaction in
order for § 1O(b) to apply. 155 While the comity concerns should be acknowledged, because
Morrison's transactional test not only bars "f-cubed" claims but other kinds of cross-border

activities such as dual-listed securities and ADRs, foreign companies could release fraudulent
information in the United States, knowing that U.S. investors would not be able to file a
successful §1O(b) claim against them. 156 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurrence in
Morrison, this would frustrate the goals of the '34 Act to protect the interest of the investors and

the public. 157 Though certain commentators favor Section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law to argue against a geographic extension of §10(b), 158 Section 402 ofthis
Restatement allows for such extension, by permitting a state to prescribe laws with respect to
conduct within its territory or outside conduct that has an effect within it's territory. 159 Given
that the goal of U.S securities laws is to protect U.S. investors and the integrity of U.S. markets,
the U.S. has a justifiable interest in regulations that extend beyond specific transactions
conducted on our markets or within our borders.
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International law favors § lO(b)'s extraterritoriality.

"Under traditional long-ann or

comity considerations, a foreign enterprise that purposefully enters a jurisdiction both to solicit
funds, to list its securities for trading and then touts its business in order to enhance the value of
these securities incurs the likelihood of finding itself falling personally under that forum's
jurisdictional authority." 160 As noted above, non-U.S. companies raise a significant amount of
capital from U.S. investors. Foreign firms that come to the United States and solicit capital,
given the financial stakes for U.S. investors, this complex relationship necessitates some kind of
§ 1O(b) protection. Moreover, a foreign issuer that takes steps necessary to sponsor ADRs or
elect to dual-list its securities could hardly claim intrusion of U.S. securities law. 161
"International comity concerns are minimized when companies choose to subject themselves to
U.S. law." 162 If Morrison is interpreted by future courts to immunize foreign issuers from
antifraud liability solely based on where the transaction occurs, unfair results follow and U.S.
investors are deprived of important rights.
Remained unanswered from Morrison, is whether U.S. investors cannot bring a § 1O(b)
claim in U.S. courts against a foreign issuer because the transaction did not take place on a U.S.
exchange, could they bring their claim in another country or under another country's law in U.S.
courts. 163 This question highlights that one has to assume that "all other countries with a stock
exchange have an adequate antifraud enforcement regime" that addresses these securities fraud
claims. 164 While some countries have enacted regulations against security fraud, certainly this
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assumption is not true for all ofthem. 165 The potential impact of Morrison is that U.S. investors
will be faced with a suit without a country, or where no law applies. 166 In cases brought by U.S.
investors for securities fraud claims arising from transactions outside of the United States,
though the investor may be an ADR holder of the affected security, given that U.S. securities law
will not apply, the U.S. court and/or the a foreign court will dismiss the claim. This is because
"courts have traditionally taken the view that courts of one nation will not enforce the "public
law" of another country." 167 Most importantly, even if the claim can be brought in the United
States or a foreign court applying the securities laws of the respective country, there is the
potential that the claim will be dismissed on forum non-conveniens grounds. 168 In such cases
evidence supporting the "core facts" --the non U.S. transaction- are elsewhere, which would
mean that applying a foreign law "would introduce a host of inconveniences and prejudicial
outcomes." 169 Therefore Morrison transaction test could lead to no adequate remedy for
defi·auded investors. Morrison scream out for Congress to amend §1O(b) to protect American
investors in foreign transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION

This paper urges Congress to make a clear pronouncement that §1O(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 apply
to extraterritorial securities transactions and thus reaches dual-listed securities and ADR
transactions. The Supreme Court's decision in Morrison significantly impacts whether U.S.
securities laws apply to dual listed securities and ADR transactions. While Morrison's decision
is applauded for creating a bright-line rule for foreign issuers, the decision carries important
165
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implications for dual listed securities and ADR transactions.

Morrison's transactional test

creates loopholes for foreign companies to commit fraud affecting U.S. investors and U.S.
markets. Given the volume of ADR transactions in the United States and the significant capital
that foreign companies raise from such transactions, Congress must act now before Morrison
erases the protection that the anti-fraud provisions of U.S. securities laws afforded U.S.
investors.
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